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The purpose of this document is to report on a review of the literature on the relation between 
safety and outsourcing or subcontracting. The review seeks to identify the problems and solutions 
that have been identified and described in the literature concerning outsourcing and 
subcontracting. 
 
The report, being the first of three reports that comprise Deliverable D1.4.1, describes results of an 
extensive review of the literature that has been referenced in science and engineering databases.  
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Executive summary – specific ERRA deliverable 
Title: 
A survey of the literature on challenges to safety posed by outsourcing or 
subcontracting of critical tasks 
WP: 1.4 Task: 1.4.1 Deliverable: 1.4.1.1 
Authors: J. Thommesen, HB Andersen(DTU) 
1. Problem description 
A number of reports and papers have been published about possible relations between outsourcing 
/subcontracting and  industrial safety and occupational health. While summary reports exist for the railway 
sector, no review exists that looks at all industries and summarises results from a wide range of engineering / 
science papers.  
2. Terminology (most important concepts) 
Term or 
expression 
Definition Synonyms Ref. * 
 
Related 
terms 
Formula 
** 
Outsourcing Acquiring a service from others that has 
until now been delivered internally 
    
Subcontracting As in outsourcing, except that it includes 
services that have not recently been 
performed internally, and may not 
realistically be in-sourced  
    
* Referring to the classification in item 10; ** Mathematical formulation (if any) 
3. Definition of the emerging risk issues 
The emerging risk issue focused on in this deliverable concerns, first, the identification of outsourcing and sub 
contracting arrangements that are particularly liable to raise safety problems, and second, identification of 
recommended practices that appear to be successful in reducing risks involved in these work arrangements. 
Outsourcing and subcontracting are emerging risk issues because the fragmentation of work and work 
coordination involved in the increasing use of outsourcing and subcontracting  appears to pose specific 
challenges to safety management  
4. Status description 
No prior survey exists that summarises the scientific  and engineering literature on outsourcing and 
subcontracting risks and safety solutions.  
5. Approach or method used 
A search has been performed (Feb. 2010) in the ISI World of Knowledge and Science Direct (Elsevier) 
databases using the search string:  < safety AND (outsourc* OR subcontract*)>. The search yielded 133 non-
overlapping records. After a first screening, non-relevant records were eliminated as judged by title or 
abstract, leaving 46 items which were retrieved in full-text format and subjected to review of each paper to 
capture relevance. Finally, 33 papers were identified as being of central relevance.   
After detailed study, properties of each article was entered into a template based in part on a template 
developed in the iNTeg-Risk project for capturing information from industrial interviews about risks involving 
subcontracting 
6. Parts of the iNTeg-Risk framework covered by the results (marked with X) 
 Pre-assessment Risk Appraisal 
Tolerability & 
Acceptability Judg. 
Risk Management 
T     
C     
H x x  x 
R x x  x 
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7. Results
The results presented in this report are mainly based on a literature review focusing on scientific 
papers. However, we have also taken into account known accidents related to subcontracting and 
existing guidelines on HSE management of contractors (appendix). 
The papers under review point to a number of characteristics associated with elevated risks, and 
the review suggests that the following risk issues are of particular importance: contract 
management, subcontractor staff, small subcontractors, safety management across interfaces, and 
regulation by authorities. 
A number of issues are related to contract management. There is thus a risk that the awarding 
process will focus on price and lead to the choice of a subcontractor with minimal consideration for 
safety and a ‘relaxed’ attitude to safety rules etc. Once a subcontractor is chosen, there is a risk 
that the incentive schemes in the contract will be biased against safety and encourage the 
subcontractor to disregard safety rather than production measures such as deadline when conflicts 
arise. There are also risks associated with pyramid subcontracting when responsibility for and 
control of employees for 2
nd
 level subcontractors is blurred.
Besides these issues related to contract management there are also a number of risks related to 
subcontractor staff. They may have inadequate safety competence, for instance if they are new or 
only part-time employees, and for the latter it may be difficult to control their total working hours, 
thus increasing the risk of exceeding fatigue limitation regulation, and undermining competence 
management systems. 
There are also risks associated with the use of small subcontractors, since they will have fewer 
resources for safety investments and may be less motivated to make such investments. 
Safety management across organizational interfaces also involves risks, notably since the 
allocation of responsibility may be unclear – and difficult to establish in a fair and manageable way. 
Finally, subcontracting arrangements also pose a challenge to regulation by authorities, both 
because of unclear responsibilities, and because they have inadequate resources to directly 
control an increasing number of companies. 
8. Extent to which the results can be generalized
Some of the problems identified in some of the studies may possibly not be pervasive, nor may all 
recommendations be effective or useful or cost-efficient or feasible. However, results such as those 
summarized above may apply widely across industries, countries and different owners and applications. 
9. Need for further work
Since the sampling and the screening and analysis methods used in this survey appear to be reliable and 
reasonably productive, further work efforts should be targeted at collecting evidence about experiences with 
and performance data about actual safety management practices and arrangements directed at outsourcing/ 
subcontracting.  The next subtask (D1.4.1.2) goes some way toward fulfilling this requirement. 
Classification of deliverable 
ERRA Topic: C 
Industry: Primarily, Oil & Gas; Construction; but any industrial domain included in survey 
Keywords: Subcontracting, Outsourcing; Safety; Risk; Safety management 
Other: 
Page 6 of 28 
1. Problem description
1.1 Background 
Industries that run large and complex operations - such as construction or oil and gas – are 
typically relying on a large number of specialized subcontractors performing interdependent 
activities. Hence, safety must be managed and coordinated across organizational boundaries. At 
the same time, the drive to outsource non-core business tasks is a trend that is visible across all 
industries, prompted by globalization and owners’ requirements to reduce costs. Outsourcing 
therefore introduces new organizational barriers in processes that previously were carried out 
internally. 
Subcontracting and outsourcing are overlapping but not identical phenomena. They both involve 
the challenge of organizing and managing safety-critical process across organizational barriers, 
but there are also different challenges characteristic of each phenomenon. In the following, the 
terms will often be used interchangeably, unless specific characteristics are emphasized. 
Many observers have raised concerns over the effects of outsourcing on safety (Ale 2005;van 
Wagner 2007), and such concerns seem confirmed by a few prominent accidents in which 
outsourcing have been a contributing factor. Both the Valujet plane crash (van Wagner 2007) and 
the Hatfield rail crash (Cullen 2001) were due to failures in outsourced maintenance operations, as 
well as to inadequate management by the ordering party. 
1.2 How to tackle the problem 
This task will identify, generalize and describe recommendations and good practices concerning 
those parts of safety management that address outsourcing and subcontracting. The 
recommendations and good practices are intended to be applied by an “Ordering Party” who seeks 
to maintain and improve safety for subcontracted tasks. The recommendations and good practices 
are based on (a) issues and solutions described in the science and engineering literature and (b) 
interviews with companies that have wide experience with ordering and monitoring subcontracting 
arrangements.  
In general, we assume that ordering parties are motivated to achieve safety when subcontracting, 
either because they will bear a considerable part of the costs associated with accidents, or 
because their reputation may suffer the most damage. However, there may be a range of concrete 
cases where this assumption does not hold; and one should be cautious and not accept a simple, 
one-sided perspective: that ordering parties are by definition well-intended defenders of safety, 
while contractors and subcontractors are more willing to sacrifice safety to gain profit. It is worth 
remembering that unsafe behavior by contractors are often triggered by contractual conditions or 
conditions otherwise provided by the ordering party, and by the ordering party’s original selection 
among bids. 
The T1.4.1 task has been divided into three sub-tasks and similarly the deliverable D1.4.1 is 
divided into three reports as described below. Prior to engaging in the subtasks a preliminary 
search and study was made by the partners of particularly salient examples of industrial accidents 
in which  outsourcing or subcontracting have been cited in accident analyses and reports as 
causally involved. Among these accidents were: the accident involving Valujet Flight 592 (May 
1996), the Tornio industrial accident (stainless steel production, 1997); and a number of rail 
accidents in British Rail following a process of deregulation (1990’s). Results from this survey and 
analysis of reports produced the beginnings of the conceptual framework applied for preparing the 
interview survey and subsequently the integrative model described below. 
The three sub-tasks and their specific reports are: 
D1.4.1.1 This report [the present report] describes a literature review that has been 
conducted to assess what is known in the literature about challenges to safety posed by 
outsourcing and subcontracting of critical tasks. The review results in a preliminary 
synthesis of challenges as well attempted solutions to such challenges. It produces an 
inventory of existing rules and organizational schemes, such as new incentive schemes, 
joint safety meetings, training and certification etc., to deal with safety related to 
outsourcing. 
D1.4.1.2  Based on a structured catalogue of issues and challenges an interview survey 
has been conducted with safety management representatives of companies that have a 
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wide experience with the safety management of subcontracting arrangements. The 
purpose of the interviews was to capture risk issues and good practices related to 
outsourcing and subcontracting. Interviews were conducted with selected companies 
across different safety-critical industries (oil & gas, construction, rail, shipbuilding, 
chemical, energy), and from different European countries. The selected companies are 
known to have initiated specific programmes to deal with outsourcing threats, and the 
interviews inquire about practical application of existing measures in unforeseen situations, 
as well as about new practices. The survey also includes a number of interviews with 
subcontractors 
D1.4.1.3  Based on the results of the literature survey and the interview study results have 
been integrated into a model of good practices aimed at managing industrial risks related 
to outsourcing and subcontracting of safety-critical tasks. The model is based partly on the 
results from the literature review and largely on a generalization of the results from the 
conducted survey. 
2.Terminology 
In this section we describe and define key terms and concepts used in the deliverables of this task. 
When no reference is given, the term is used by a large number of sources and, in some cases, an 
attempt at making the term precise has been developed by the task group.  
Good practices 
The report will present good practices from the interviews and the literature, but will refrain from 
using the term ‘best practices’. 
Ordering Party (OP) 
In a contractual relation, the OP is the party that defines (scope, schedule…), finances, monitors, 
and assesses the work to be done. Furthermore, the OP chooses the contractor (i.e. the party that 
carries out activities) according to its own criteria. 
Contractor, Subcontractor (SC) 
The terms contractor and subcontractor are used interchangeably, since some of the companies 
interviewed emphasize that they, according to standard terminology in their industry, use 
contractors, not subcontractors. In this report, the term subcontractor does not denote a secondary 
level of contracts. In that case, we will instead use the term cascading contracts. 
Services, not products 
This report focuses on providers of services, not suppliers of (standardized) products. In principle, 
the safety and quality of supplied products can be controlled simply by examining those products, 
while the safety and quality of services are more complex and difficult to monitor. The distinction 
between products and services tends to fade for non-standardized products, however. 
Subcontracting vs. outsourcing 
Outsourcing: acquiring from others what has until now been done internally. Considering safety 
related to outsourcing also includes the question whether it is safe to outsource, or whether it 
would be safer to keep the operation internally. In other words, outsourcing hinges on the ’make or 
buy’ decision – the choice between hierarchy (internal) and market (external) (Williamson 1990) 
Subcontracting:  also includes services that have not recently been performed internally, and 
may not realistically be in-sourced. Considering safety and subcontracting will primarily look for 
better ways to control subcontracting, and not consider the option of avoiding it. 
Cascading or pyramid contracts 
When the main contractor delegates tasks to other contractors (often termed subcontractors). 
Globalization (not included) 
This study does not consider the problems that arise when companies outsource production to 
countries with weaker regulation. Focus is on the problems associated with using the market for 
safety-critical services, rather than producing the service internally. 
 Page 8 of 28 
Economic motives for safety (Savage 1999): 
Safety requires an extra investment, whether in the form of direct costs, or indirectly by moving 
resources from production to safety (Reason 1997). A company invests in safety to reduce the risk 
of accidents. Safety is a non-event, and the benefits of safety investments are difficult to observe 
directly. It is thus an investment characterized by several uncertainties. First, the benefit depends 
on the probability of the accidents to be prevented by the investments. Normally, safety 
investments – especially for low probability/high consequence risks – do not pay off for individual 
or even few transactions (e.g. a short-term contract), but only in the long run. For small companies 
safety investments may be relatively larger, and the likelihood of the events to be avoided will be 
smaller. Second, the benefit depends on the costs of an accident, and besides the direct costs in 
the form of damaged production material and production losses, the additional indirect costs 
associated with fatalities/injuries to staff, and effects on the environment or 3
rd
 parties depend on 
the extent to which the company is held responsible by regulation.   
The uncertain price of safety: 
It is difficult to specify the safety level in a contract – and difficult to estimate the price of that 
safety. For highly standardized services, safe working procedures and the use of certain types of 
safety equipment can be equally standardized, which at least makes it possible for specific safety 
precautions to be included in a specification of the work. For non-standardized work however, a 
precise description of safety precautions becomes intrinsically difficult.  Changes in regulation may 
also complicate the price of safety: Over the past decades the legislation philosophy has been 
changing from a prescriptive approach (a prescribed manner to carry out the work safely, with 
relatively well-defined costs in the form of procedures and equipment) to a performance (e.g. the 
work must be carried out “safely”) or to a process approach (a management system must be in 
place to ensure that the work is carried out “safely”) – where the required costs are much more 
uncertain. The difficulty of specifying and pricing safety in a contract works both ways: it is difficult 
for the ordering party to specify exactly what the required level of safety is; it is difficult for the 
contractor to understand the exact required safety level; it is difficult for the ordering party to check 
the actual level of safety provided by the winning contractor. 
2.1 Why outsourcing? 
There are two main economic) reasons given both in the literature but also repeated during the 
interviews conducted by the partners (D1.4.1.2) for outsourcing: capacity and specialty. 
Capacity:  When the OP does not have adequate capacity of required resources (equipment, 
skills) the services are outsourced. This reason is also related to flexibility: OP does not wish to 
build up/maintain ‘surplus’ capacity that may be excessive in other periods. By contracting, the OP 
also avoid overhead costs associated with a large internal staff, including usual employer 
obligations such as termination and dismissal procedures, employments rights, severance 
payments, administrative burden. Investing in internal dedicated staff/resources for periodic/non-
permanent tasks poses a challenge to coordination: how to allocate those dedicated resources for 
similar tasks in ‘idle’ periods. Subcontracting/outsourcing transfers that problem to the market: 
subcontractors now have to plan the allocation of their resources to various clients – they have to 
bid for a large number of contracts at the risk of over-stretching. If they win too many contracts, 
they will have to hire new or temporary staff. On the other, the advantage for the subcontractors – 
compared to internal departments – is that they are free to bid for outside jobs and thus optimize 
the use of their dedicated resources. 
Expertise/specialty: The OP does not have the required expertise ‘in-door’; other companies 
already have the expertise and can provide the services better, faster or cheaper. And the OP 
does not want to build up or maintain the required expertise internally, e.g. because it cannot be 
done at reasonable costs, or because the tasks are considered to be beyond the OP’s ‘core 
business’. 
 
 
2.2 Abbreviations 
OP: Ordering Party. 
SC: SubContractor. 
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2.3 Theoretical perspectives on the choice of outsourcing 
As a supplement to these basic motives for outsourcing, some theoretical perspectives can help 
understand some of the dynamics behind the choice of outsourcing. 
2.4 Principal-Agent relation: 
According to this theory, subcontracting introduces two partly adversarial roles when a Principal 
delegates work to an Agent1. The contract relation involves a conflict of interest (partly differing 
goals), since the Principal wants the Agent to perform as much as possible for the price he pays, 
and the Agent wants to fulfill the contract (and perhaps increase the chance of future contracts) by 
performing at the lowest cost  possible. This conflict of interest constitutes a challenge to the 
Principal when the work is performed under conditions of asymmetrical information that make it 
difficult to control whether the Agent has performed appropriately. The principal can use various 
incentive mechanisms to align the Agent’s interests with his own, but these mechanisms all tend to 
also have unintended consequences.  
This theory is relevant, since safety concerns tend to involve asymmetrical information in the 
sense that it is difficult to monitor how safely a task is performed.  
While principal-agent relations certainly also exist within a company, between different roles, they 
may be moderated by a strong safety culture. With contracting, however,  the ordering party must 
accept that the contractors (by design) are not “company men” impregnated with the ordering 
company’s culture and shared values; contractor employees may not know or not care much about 
the ordering party’s vision and long term business objectives.  Contractors have, at best, a divided 
loyalty towards the ordering company and the mother company. 
2.5 Two economic aspects on outsourcing: 
Classical economic theory offers two explanations of why a contractor may perform more 
effectively:  1) Economies of scale: they may benefit from performing a larger amount of the same 
type of work. 2) Economies of scope: they may already use the same resources (expertise, 
equipment) for related tasks (Prager 2008). These reasons are already implicit in the capacity and 
specialty motives mentioned above. 
Transaction cost theory (Caniels & Roeleveld 2009;Williamson 1990), on the other hand, points 
out that gaining benefits from the market rather than internal production requires a well-functioning 
market where it is possible to compare products and prices – thus with no or few ‘market failures’. 
In that case, competition among bidders, and even between external bidders and internal 
departments, reveal and reduce the costs required. But in many cases the prices are less 
transparent. Transaction costs are thus the costs of using the market – comparing prices, 
managing contracts etc. – and they increase with asset specificity (when the job requires 
dedicated resources that cannot be used elsewhere) and uncertainty, and decrease with 
transaction frequency (since more transactions increases knowledge about the other part and thus 
reduces uncertainty). It can be argued that the safety element of a task represents a high degree 
of uncertainty that makes it difficult to specify and control in a contract. 
3.Definition of emerging issue(s), including the emerging risk character 
 
The emerging risk character is stated (in Section 3.1), and the emerging risk attributes presented 
(in Section 3.2). 
3.1 Emerging risk character 
According to OSHA
2
 an emerging risk is a risk that is both “new” and/or “increasing”. It is “new” if 
and only if: 
(a) the risk was previously unknown and is caused by new processes, new technologies, 
new types of workplace, or social or organizational change; or 
                                                 
1
 Wikipedia on the Principal-Agent problem: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principal-agent_problem.  
2
 http://osha.europa.eu/en/campaigns/riskobservatory/risks/intro/index_html#what (Note that OSHA is 
focusing on Occupational Risk, whereas the iNTeg-Risk project focuses on Major Accident Risk. Thus, the 
OSHA definition of emerging risk is adapted to fit the scope of iNTeg-Risk.) 
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(b) a long-standing issue is newly considered as a risk due to a change in social or public 
perceptions (e.g. stress, bullying); or 
(c) new scientific knowledge allows a long-standing issue to be identified as a risk. 
The risk is “increasing” if and only if 
i) the number of hazards leading to the risk is growing, or  
ii) the likelihood of exposure to the hazard leading to the risk is increasing, (exposure 
level and/or the number of people exposed), or  
iii) the effect of the hazard on workers' health is getting worse (seriousness of health 
effects and/or the number of people affected). 
Outsourcing and subcontracting are work arrangements that have been used for centuries and 
probably millennia. But nevertheless, they may also be considered to involve emerging risks in the 
sense of the OSHA definition.  
They have an emerging risk character, because 
 first, there is growing recognition that the fragmentation of work and work 
coordination involved in outsourcing and subcontracting  may pose specific 
challenges to safety management – so the risk is “new” in the sense of (b); in 
addition, one may also say the risk character is to some extent “new” in the 
sense of (a), in so far as outsourcing and subcontracting are used increasingly 
in some domains;  
 second, it is “increasing” in the sense of subpoints (i) and (ii) in so far as there 
are some domains in which safety critical tasks that were previously carried 
out by “mother company” will now be delegated to subcontractors. 
3.2 Emerging risk attributes 
The “types” of risks associated with outsourcing and subcontracting can be characterized only at a 
general level, since the concrete risks depend entirely on the industry targeted.  
In Table 3.1 we depict the general attributes 
 
Table 3.1 Risk attributes 
Type of risk attribute ERRA specific risk attributes 
Source of hazard Inadequate safety management  
Element at risk to hazard Production facilities and built environment 
Natural environment
 
Human health 
Hazardous situation Depends on industry and specific application 
Main stakeholders Ordering party  (contract awarding company) 
Subcontractor(s) 
Depending on industry and specific application: 
various 
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4. Status description 
No general treatment exists of the challenges to safety management posed by outsourcing and 
subcontracting focusing on health, safety and environment issues. However, “Guidelines for 
managing risk in outsourcing utilizing the AS/NZS 4360:2004 process”  (HB 240—2004) published 
by Australian Standards (Autralian Standards, 2001) is in fact a general guideline about risk 
management. However, this report addresses primarily risk management in the framework of 
business risks. Risk is thus defined as "the chance of something happening that will have an 
impact on objectives”, where of course concerns about “health, safety and environment” from only 
a minor part of the objectives behind running a business. Other relevant contributions are found in 
reviews of industrial accidents or risks and subcontracting in specific domains, such as the 
Ladbroke Railway Accident Inquiry (Cullen, 2001).  
No literature review seems to have been performed of the risk issues and possible solutions 
identified concerning outsourcing and subcontracting. Therefore, the results of the survey 
performed in this subtask appear to fill out a lacuna in current knowledge.  
5. Methods 
A search has been performed (Feb. 2010) in the ISI World of Knowledge and Science Direct 
(Elsevier) databases using the following search string: “ safety AND (outsourc* OR subcontract*)”. 
The search yielded 133 non-overlapping records. A two-stage screening was then applied to the 
records retrieved. At the first screening, irrelevant records were eliminated as judged by title or 
abstract. This left 46 items which were retrieved in full-text format and subjected to the second 
screening involving full review of each paper to capture relevance. Finally, 33 papers were 
identified as being of central relevance.   
After detailed study, properties of each article was entered into a template based in part on a 
template developed in the iNTeg-Risk project for capturing information from industrial interviews 
about risks involving subcontracting.  
5.1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The terms ‘subcontracting’ and ‘outsourcing’ are largely overlapping in their meaning, though not 
entirely. We shall also use the terms as largely interchangeable. 
‘Outsourcing’ suggests, and ‘subcontracting’ does not, that the activity or service that is now 
contracted out or outsourced has previously been managed by the outsourcing part. 
‘Subcontracting’ implies that there is contractor and a subcontractor. In construction, the roles are 
usually distinct and clear: an owner hires a contractor to perform an activity and the contractor in 
turn hires subcontractors to perform part activities. In some contexts, the owner becomes the 
contractor, so ‘subcontractor’ comes to refer to any party who supplies a service for an owner or 
contractor.   
In addition, ‘outsourcing’ is often used to refer to services or lines of production that a ‘contracted 
out’ to parties in countries with low levels of wages and other costs. In this paper, we do not 
address this aspect except when it relates to HSE aspects.  
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6.Parts of the framework covered 
The parts of the iNTeg-Risk framework covered by this deliverable are illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Indication of ERRA C1 deliverable D1.4.1.1  contribution to the iNTeg-Risk 
framework 
 
This deliverable (D1.4.1.1) reporting on the results of literature survey covers largely the Human 
(C) dimension and, for the pre-assessment phase, also the regulatory (R) dimension of the ERMF 
framework.   
Most items in the IRGC framework are potentially relevant to the safety management challenges 
raised by outsourcing and subcontracting – potentially relevant because each of the items (listed in 
the below) may well appear to be of central importance for a specific domain and specific 
application. 
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Table 6.1  
Pre-Assessment  
Problem framing x 
Early warning x 
Screening x 
Determination of Scientific Conventions  
Risk Appraisal  
Risk Assessment  
- Hazard identification & Estimation x 
- Exposure & Vulnerability Assessment x 
- Risk Estimation x 
Concern Assessment  
- Risk Perceptions x 
- Social Concerns x 
- Socio-Economic Impacts x 
Tolerability & Acceptability Judgement  
Risk Characterisation  
- Risk Profile  
- Judgment of the Seriousness of Risk  
- Conclusions & Risk Reduction Options  
Risk Evaluation  
- Judging the Tolerability & Acceptability  
- Need for Risk Reduction Measures  
Risk Management  
Decision Making  
- Option Identification & Generation x 
- Option Assessment x 
- Option Evaluation & Selection x 
Implementation  
- Option Realisation x 
- Monitoring & Control x 
- Feedback from Risk Mgm’t Practice x 
 
7. Results  
Many of the reviewed papers agree that there is a tendency toward increasing outsourcing. What 
are the ‘drivers’ behind this? Of course, the wish to reduce costs is an often cited reason for 
outsourcing. But there are other and forceful reasons:  Thus, companies may outsource certain 
tasks to achieve flexibility (also termed capacity subcontracting) (Arnold & Bowie 2003). This 
allows the company to achieve extra capacity in peak periods. 
Another reason for subcontracting is to acquire relevant expertise from a specialized 
subcontractor, e.g., in the form of specialized equipment or specialized labor (specialty 
subcontracting). When outsourcing a hitherto internally managed function, a company recognizes 
the potential of another company to accumulate more expertise by specialization (Kartam, Flood, & 
Koushki 2000), by performing similar tasks for other companies. This corresponds partly to the 
traditional economic argument emphasizing economies of scale and scope (Prager 2008): in order 
to capitalize on dedicated resources, it is necessary to apply them to a large ‘volume’, or to various 
similar tasks where the same resources are required.  
Some authors have suggested a further motivation for subcontracting: risk transfer (Loosemore & 
Andonakis 2007). Thus, responsibilities for occupational health and safety (OHS) are handed over 
to subcontractors, along with the burden of understanding and complying with regulation. Similarly, 
subcontractors are often assigned to particularly dangerous tasks (Deutsch, Adler, & Richter 
1992;Kenny & Bezuidenhout 1999), and carry higher risk of accident (Salminen et al. 1993). 
However, benefits of outsourcing and subcontracting depend on the existence of a well-functioning 
market for the services to be outsourced, i.e., the transaction costs associated with the contracts 
must not be too high. If a high degree of uncertainty is implied, or the services require dedicated 
assets (asset specificity) that cannot be applied elsewhere (Caniels & Roeleveld 2009;Nunez 
2009;Williamson 1990), prices can be difficult to assess and compare, and a large amount of 
resources must be spend on managing and monitoring the contract (Prager 2008). In fact, the 
aspect of uncertainty explicitly counterbalances the wish to transfer risk, since one may have to 
pay a higher price for high risk operations (Nunez 2009). 
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Besides concerns for the efficiency of price mechanisms, companies may also be discouraged 
from outsourcing, if this increases their dependency on critical resources from a particular supplier 
(Caniels & Roeleveld 2009;Pfeffer & Salancik 1979). 
7.1 Process of awarding contracts 
Several authors point to the risk that the ordering party focuses on price rather than safety when 
selecting among bids. For instance, it has been argued that public construction projects, due to the 
competitive bidding process, are “frequently awarded to contractors without regard to their ability to 
deliver a safe project” (Huang & Hinze 2006). Obviously, this selection may give priority to cost-
efficient, but unsafe subcontractors. 
Table 7.1  Problems and recommendations concerning contract issues 
Problems Recommendations 
Awarding of contracts merely based on 
cost without regard for safety (Gochfeld & 
Mohr 2007;Hasle 2007;Huang & Hinze 
2006) 
Hard contracts hardly compatible with 
establishment of safe working conditions 
(Busck 2007) 
Tight deadlines may not allow time for 
safety preparation (Cullen 
2001;Loosemore & Andonakis 2007) 
Subcontractor pressed by productivity 
measures to sacrifice safety (Loosemore 
& Andonakis 2007;Mayhew & Quinlan 
1999;Mayhew, Quinlan, & Ferris 1997) 
Pyramid contracting increases risk of 
noncompliance (Loosemore & Andonakis 
2007) 
Taking OHS and safety into consideration 
when choosing among bids (Busck 
2007;Hasle 2007) 
Bids should include safety measures to be 
1) approved and probably 2) rewarded with
points (Hasle 2007) 
Selection of subcontractors should also be 
based on past safety performance: 
1) EMR (Experience Modification Ratings)
(+/-) (Glazner et al. 1999;Huang & Hinze 
2006) 
2) Sickness absenteeism and staff
turnover (+/-) (Hasle 2007) 
3) Safety climate
Create long-term relationships and 
relational contracts (+/-)(Busck 
2007;Glazner, Borgerding, Bondy, Lowery, 
Lezotte, & Kreiss 1999;Molenaar, Park, & 
Washington 2009) 
Avoid pyramid contracting (Loosemore & 
Andonakis 2007;Molenaar, Park, & 
Washington 2009) 
Various countermeasures are suggested – and sometimes implemented – that emphasize safety 
in the bidding process. One is to include safety as a parameter in the bid, requiring bidders to state 
safety measures such as safety plans and relevant safety equipment – and possibly to reward 
such measures with points that are taken into account in combination with price when selecting the 
best (Hasle 2007). Another solution is to consider the bidders’ past safety performance when 
selecting among subcontractors, for instance by looking at Experience Modification Ratings (EMR) 
(Glazner, Borgerding, Bondy, Lowery, Lezotte, & Kreiss 1999) – although this indicator has also 
been criticized as lagging and inaccurate (Huang & Hinze 2006) – or by keeping track on the 
ordering party’s own past experiences with particular subcontractor. 
A third solution is to build long-term relationships with subcontractors in order to cooperate and 
build trust regarding safety. It has thus been argued that a regime of ‘hard’ contracts will decrease 
OHS, as opposed to ‘relational’ contracts based on mutual commitment and trust (Busck 2007). 
Long-term contracts will also allow the subcontractor to accumulate safety expertise, build safety 
culture and make appropriate investments in safety (Cullen 2001). However, there are also some 
evidence indicating negative consequences of cooperative relationships which one study found to 
be associated with higher injury rates (Glazner, Borgerding, Bondy, Lowery, Lezotte, & Kreiss 
1999). 
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7.2 Measure of performance 
Contracts with subcontractors are often designed with a strong focus on production performance in 
terms of productivity, deadlines etc. As mentioned before, the very advantage of using an external 
subcontractor is the opportunity to reduce prices by competition among bidders, and incentives 
and penalties based on productivity are included to ensure the realization of those benefits.  
However, such measures, if unchecked by similar safety measures, may also put a pressure on 
subcontractors to make unsafe choices, both in their preparations – training and equipment – and 
in unforeseen situations that threaten to cause delays.  
This problem also concerns contracts with individual part-time workers based on piecework wages, 
which are associated with more accidents (Mayhew & Quinlan 1999). 
7.3 Size of subcontractors 
In some industries, a large number of small subcontractors, sometimes based on part-time labor, 
may offer a high flexibility for larger companies. However, small subcontractors tend to have more 
accidents than larger ones (Salminen, Saari, Saarela, & Rasanen 1993;Yamataki et al. 2006). 
There are several reasons why smaller subcontractors have more difficulties in complying with 
safety regulations. First, they do not have the resources required to keep track of changing 
regulations, control safety expertise of their employees and make larger investments in safety, 
such as equipment or training (Loosemore & Andonakis 2007;Mayhew, Quinlan, & Ferris 1997). 
Second, small companies are less susceptible to some of the external mechanisms that enforce or 
encourage compliance. They are difficult to control by authorities (see below), may be more 
evasive (Haines 1996) and they may avoid problems of liability and reputation by going out of 
business (Azari-Rad, Philips, & Thompson-Dawson 2003). 
 
Table 7.2  Problems and solutions concerning small subcontractors 
Problems Recommendations 
More accidents and higher injury rates 
(Salminen, Saari, Saarela, & Rasanen 
1993) 
More evasive (Haines 1996;Yamataki, 
Suwazono, Okubo, Miyamoto, Uetani, 
Kobayashi, & Nogawa 2006) 
Limited resources to invest in safety 
(Azari-Rad, Philips, & Thompson-
Dawson 2003;Kartam, Flood, & Koushki 
2000;Mayhew, Quinlan, & Ferris 1997) 
Less motivated by traditional incentives 
to invest in safety (Azari-Rad, Philips, & 
Thompson-Dawson 2003;Haines 1996) 
Uncertain availability of subcontractor 
resources (eg. when allocating among 
different projects) (Zou, Zhang, & Wang 
2007) 
Subcontractor selection (see Table 1) 
Subsidising small companies for the costs 
of training (Loosemore & Andonakis 2007) 
Better integration of OHS training into 
general skills training (Loosemore & 
Andonakis 2007) 
 
7.4 Multi-layer or pyramid subcontracting 
Safety also tends to decrease when a project involves several layers of subcontractors, i.e. when 
one subcontractor on its part acquires services delivered by other subcontractors or by self-
employed workers – so-called ‘pyramid subcontracting’. Several layers of contracts will increase 
the number of organizational interfaces and blur the roles and responsibilities for the various 
employers involved (Haines 1996;Mayhew, Quinlan, & Ferris 1997;van Wagner 2007). 
As a solution it is often stated or implied that the number of levels should be reduced, and one 
paper recommends that “pyramid contracting should be reduced and parallel contracting 
encouraged” (Loosemore & Andonakis 2007). 
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7.5 Safety expertise required 
Employees’ safety expertise includes two distinct aspects: general expertise based on training and 
experience, and knowledge of the particular work site. 
Subcontractor staff may be young and inexperienced (Gochfeld & Mohr 2007), not be properly 
trained and supervised to work safely (Darragh et al. 2004;Loosemore & Andonakis 2007), or fail 
to have the qualifications to produce a safe result (van Wagner 2007). This holds in particular for 
smaller companies, to whom the costs associated with training constitute a significant barrier, as 
argued previously. 
Table 7.3. Problems and solutions concerning qualifications of subcontractor staff 
Problems Recommendations 
Inadequate skills/training/experience 
(Darragh, Stallones, Bigelow, & Keefe 
2004;Deutsch, Adler, & Richter 
1992;Gochfeld & Mohr 2007;Zou, Zhang, 
& Wang 2007) 
Lack of site-specific knowledge 
(Salminen, Saari, Saarela, & Rasanen 
1993) 
Scarcity of skilled/trained labour (Zou, 
Zhang, & Wang 2007) 
Difficulties in allocating subcontractor 
resources among different projects (Zou, 
Zhang, & Wang 2007) 
Short-term permits for hazardous activities 
(Huang & Hinze 2006) 
Better integration of OHS training into 
general skills training (Loosemore & 
Andonakis 2007) 
Subsidising small companies for the costs 
of training (Loosemore & Andonakis 2007) 
Subcontractor should be responsible for 
worker’s training (+/-) (Toole 2002) 
Occupational licensing for safety-critical 
tasks (+/-) (Haas 2008) 
Temporary training prior to work (Zou, 
Zhang, & Wang 2007) 
Long-term planning to secure availability 
of qualified labour (Zou, Zhang, & Wang 
2007) 
Several measures are suggested to reduce problems with inadequate expertise: better monitoring 
and control of employees’ expertise, short-term rather than long-term permits (Huang & Hinze 
2006), clear responsibility for training (Toole 2002), and subsidizing companies for the costs of 
training (Loosemore & Andonakis 2007). 
Some of the challenges can be summarized in the dilemma faced by the European aircraft 
maintenance industry, when choosing between company-led training and (individual) occupational 
licensing (Haas 2008). Eventually, the choice fell on the latter option, partly based on the concern 
that companies may be tempted to cut back on investments in training during economic crises, as 
long as the negative consequences are not expected in the immediate future.  
The safety of subcontractor staff may also suffer from inadequate knowledge of the specific work 
site. This is obvious for both construction workers (Salminen, Saari, Saarela, & Rasanen 1993) 
and maintenance subcontractors in most industries (Lind 2008), who often work on new and 
unknown locations. Countermeasures exist to make up for lack of site knowledge, including 
adequate prior site visits. 
7.6 Employment status 
A number of challenges are associated with the often tenuous employment status of subcontractor 
staff. Subcontractors typically achieve their flexibility by hiring part-time workers who may also be 
employed by other companies, either simultaneously or in different periods. At the other extreme, a 
subcontractor may in fact inherit the working staff from the previous contract holder of a contract 
(Hasle 2007).  
The use of part-time employees or self-employed workers pose a number of challenges to safety, 
as expressed in the Dual Labour Market Theory that regards this work force as more exposed to 
various hazards and insecurities (Mayhew, Quinlan, & Ferris 1997). But their employers also face 
difficulties in controlling their part-time staff’s qualifications, experience and working hours. 
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7.7 Working hours 
Subcontractors, and sometimes their clients, are required to maintain a log of their employees’ 
working hours, both to ensure and document that they do not exceed fatigue limitation regulation, 
but also to monitor their level of experience with particular types of tasks. In some cases, a certain 
number of working hours is required to maintain a particular level or rise to another level. 
Yet when subcontractor staff is working for two or more employers, it becomes difficult for each 
employer to control working hours; this in turn raises the risk of fatigue-induced accidens. The risk 
is exacerbated by the fact that subcontract workers are already more likely than direct hires to 
work more than 60 hours per week (Gochfeld & Mohr 2007), regardless of whether their exceeding 
safe working hours is a deliberate violation or is simply due to inadequate monitoring. 
7.8 Safety management across interfaces 
A significant challenge associated with subcontracting is the often unclear allocation of 
responsibility among the different roles involved. This is clearly illustrated by the construction 
industry, which, as mentioned,  typically has an owner hiring a main contractor who again hires a 
number subcontractors to perform various tasks (Arditi & Chotibhongs 2005). In addition, the 
architect and/or engineers responsible for the design of the intended construction may be assigned 
certain safety responsibilities (Toole 2002). 
The allocation of responsibility for various aspects of safety is often unclear in both the relevant 
standards and regulations, and in the specific contracts, and the division of responsibilities is 
further challenged by court rulings or researchers (Toole 2002). And even if the legally defined 
responsibilities should be clear on paper, subcontractors may not always be aware of them 
(Loosemore & Andonakis 2007). 
A solution to the lack of clarity is of course to clarify responsibilities, both in particular contracts 
and, in some cases, in regulation. Yet there remain some dilemmas in trying to achieve a fair and 
workable allocation. 
On the one hand, it has been argued that too much responsibility has traditionally been placed on 
the shoulders of the players most directly involved in work, the subcontractor employers who may 
be under economic pressure from the contract have inadequate resources to invest in safety. 
Therefore, the argument goes, responsibilities should be pushed beyond the direct employers to 
the often larger companies further up the contractual ‘food chain’. The larger companies have the 
resources to keep track of regulations and to invest in safety (Loosemore & Andonakis 2007), and 
this can even be associated with a moral obligation (Arnold & Bowie 2003), as part of their 
corporate social responsibility. 
On the other hand there is a risk that these remote employers are then being held responsible for 
potential accident factors that they cannot control (Toole 2002). For instance, publicly awarded 
contracts are sometimes criticized for giving inadequate priority to safety, which has led public 
owners to include more detailed safety requirements in the contracts (Hasle 2007). However, 
these requirements also tend to reduce the authority and competence of the contrac-
tor/subcontractor who is then unable to implement changes and improvements. This dilemma has 
led some to recommend tripartite coordination and shared responsibility of safety (Hasle 2007), but 
the appropriateness of the solution will probably depend of the particular constellation of involved 
players.  
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Table 7.4  Problems and recommendations concerning responsibility issues.  
(‘vs.’ indicates a possible conflict between two recommendations.) 
Problems Recommendations 
Outsourcers avoid responsibility (Busck 
2007;Deutsch, Adler, & Richter 1992;Haines 
1996;Hasle 2007;Loosemore & Andonakis 
2007;Salminen, Saari, Saarela, & Rasanen 
1993) 
Confusion about responsibilities (Kartam, Flood, 
& Koushki 2000;Loosemore & Andonakis 
2007;Salminen, Saari, Saarela, & Rasanen 
1993;Toole 2002) 
Unclear responsibilities for OHS in 
contract/legislation (Toole 2002) 
OHS responsibilities allocated to the ‘weakest’ 
player (subcontractor) (Haines 1996;Loosemore 
& Andonakis 2007) 
Subcontractors have inadequate resources to 
assume OHS responsibilities (Loosemore & 
Andonakis 2007) 
OHS responsibilities allocated to agents not in 
position to monitor and control them 
Companies (clients) held legally responsible by 
courts for OHS (Grossel 2002;Huang & Hinze 
2006;Loosemore & Andonakis 2007;Toole 
2002) 
Contracts reduce/limit subcontractor’s control 
over OHS factors (Hasle 2007) 
Subcontractors have limited control over 
important OHS factors (Busck 2007;Hasle 2007) 
Outsourcers should assume responsibility for 
OHS (Arnold & Bowie 2003;Busck 
2007;Haines 1996) 
  vs. 
Subcontractors best suited to assume 
responsibility for OHS (Toole 2002) 
Responsibilities clarified in contract (implicit) 
  vs. 
‘Relational’ contracts based on trust and 
dialogue (Busck 2007) 
Tripartite responsibility (Hasle 2007) 
 
 
 
7.9 Regulation by authorities 
Extensive use of subcontracting presents safety authorities with new challenges. Thus, authorities 
are criticized for inadequate monitoring of subcontractors (Mayhew, Quinlan, & Ferris 1997), and 
were regarded as partly responsible for the Valujet accident (van Wagner 2007). It also suggested 
that authorities should play a more pro-active role vis-à-vis subcontractors, for instance by 
informing about changes in regulations to small companies that may be less able to keep up to 
date by themselves. 
But the increasing role of small subcontractors constitute an obvious problem to authorities who 
typically will not have adequate resources to, for instance, make auditing visits to a large number 
of companies. This may lead the authorities to rely on the larger companies to control the safety 
measures implemented by their own subcontractors; but such solutions could be compromised by 
conflicts of interests (van Wagner 2007). 
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Table 7.5 Overview of reviewed papers.  
(‘*’ outsourcing/ sub-contracting and safety are the main focus the paper) 
Paper Industry 
(Arditi & Chotibhongs 2005) Construction 
(Arnold & Bowie 2003)* Manufacturing 
(Azari-Rad, Philips, & Thompson-Dawson 2003)* Construction 
(Busck 2007)* Waste collection 
(Cullen 2001) Railway 
(Darragh, Stallones, Bigelow, & Keefe 2004) Construction 
(Deutsch, Adler, & Richter 1992) - 
(Fang, Chen, & Wong 2006) Construction 
(Glazner, Borgerding, Bondy, Lowery, Lezotte, & Kreiss 1999) Construction 
(Gochfeld & Mohr 2007)* 
Chemical; 
Nuclear 
(Grossel 2002)* Chemical 
(Haines 1996)* Mining; other 
(Hallowell & Gambatese 2009) Construction 
(Hasle 2007)* Public Transport 
(Huang & Hinze 2006) Construction 
(Haas 2008) Air traffic 
(Kartam, Flood, & Koushki 2000) Construction 
(Kenny & Bezuidenhout 1999) Mining 
(Lind 2008) - 
(Loosemore & Andonakis 2007)* Construction 
(Mayhew & Quinlan 1999)* 
Clothing 
Industry 
(Mayhew, Quinlan, & Ferris 1997)* 
Transport; Child 
care;Hospitality 
(Molenaar, Park, & Washington 2009) Construction 
(Nunez 2009)* - 
(Prager 2008) Public Services 
(Quinlan & Bohle 2008)* - 
(Quinlan & Bohle 2009) - 
(Quinlan, Mayhew, & Bohle 2001) - 
(Quinlan, Johnstone, & McNamara 2009) - 
(Salminen, Saari, Saarela, & Rasanen 1993) - 
(Toole 2002)* Construction 
(van Wagner 2007)* Air traffic 
(Yamataki, Suwazono, Okubo, Miyamoto, Uetani, Kobayashi, & 
Nogawa 2006) 
Steel production 
(Zou, Zhang, & Wang 2007) Construction 
 
8. Extent to which results may be generalized 
The papers under review point to a number of characteristics associated with elevated risks, and 
the review suggests that the following risk issues are of particular importance: contract 
management, subcontractor staff, small subcontractors, safety management across interfaces, 
and regulation by authorities. 
A number of issues are related to contract management. There is thus a risk that the awarding 
process will focus on price and lead to the choice of a subcontractor with minimal consideration for 
safety and a ‘relaxed’ attitude to safety rules etc. Once a subcontractor is chosen, there is a risk 
that the incentive schemes in the contract will be biased against safety and encourage the 
subcontractor to disregard safety rather than production measures such as deadline when conflicts 
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arise. There are also risks associated with pyramid subcontracting when responsibility for and 
control of employees for 2
nd
 level subcontractors is blurred. 
Besides these issues related to contract management there are also a number of risks related to 
subcontractor staff. They may have inadequate safety competence, for instance if they are new or 
only part-time employees, and for the latter it may be difficult to control their total working hours, 
thus increasing the risk of exceeding fatigue limitation regulation, and undermining competence 
management systems. 
There are also risks associated with the use of small subcontractors, since they will have fewer 
resources for safety investments and may be less motivated to make such investments. 
Safety management across organizational interfaces also involves risks, notably since the 
allocation of responsibility may be unclear – and difficult to establish in a fair and manageable way. 
Finally, subcontracting arrangements also pose a challenge to regulation by authorities, both 
because of unclear responsibilities, and because they have inadequate resources to directly 
control an increasing number of companies. 
The generalizability of results refers, for this ERRA and this survey, to whether a specific risk issue 
and / or a specific “solution” that has been identified in a given study that is now reviewed may 
apply to other industries or perhaps just other applications or sites within the same industry. The 
short answer is that there is too little evidence to assess in any rigorous way this important issue of 
generalizability (external validity). The fact that a given arrangement has produced safety problems 
– or has solved safety problems - for a site in one country for one industry does demonstrate that 
the same arrangement will produce the same problems (or yield the same solution) for other sites, 
let alone in other industries and other countries.  Nevertheless, the four risk issues in the bullet list 
cited above are not likely to be merely local concerns.   
The question of generalizability (external validity) will be discussed in the third subreport (D1.4.1.3) 
where the evidence behind a proposed model of good practice for safety management will be 
summarised.  
9. Further work 
Upon completing a literature survey results should always be queried in terms of completeness: 
has the survey sampled wide enough and has it used reasonable inclusion and exclusion criteria? 
Was the screening procedure reliable? 
The authors believe that the databases from which used (ISI World of Knowledge and Science 
Direct) are representative of the field and are not aware of any key safety or risk journals that are 
not included in these databases. Informal searches using Google Scholar were also performed, 
but yielded no further studies to be included.  
We therefore also believe that further work should be directed at gaining information about 
performance of and experiences with actual safety management practices concerning outsourcing 
and subcontracting. Part of this work was undertaken for the next subtask of this ERRA and is 
reported in D1.4.1.2.  
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Appendix: Guidelines for contractor management 
 
 
 
 
 
Guidelines for safe management of contractors are normally structured in a number of phases in the 
contracting process, as illustrated by the more comprehensive guideline in 8 phases provided by the 
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (Error! Reference source not found.). Other guidelines 
have fewer phases, but the basic structure is the same. E.g. phase 2 – HSE capability assessment – 
emphasizes the need for a basic identification of acceptable contractors, and the advantages of maintaining 
a list of approved contractors based on previous experience: evaluation (phase 8) from previous projects. 
The OGP guideline distinguishes between three different modes of contracting, basically depending on 
whether work is executed under the HSE Management System of the client (mode 1) or the contractor’s 
own HSE-MS (mode 2), in some cases without interfaces with the client’s HSE-MS (mode 3) (OGP 2010). 
A regional guideline from the same industry emphasizes the need for a specific approach to small or short-
term contractors, for which it may not be appropriate or economically viable to provide its own 
comprehensive health and safety program (ARPEL 2003). 
Most guidelines emphasize the necessity of defining conditions for the use of (cascading) sub-contractors, 
and one guideline focuses explicitly on this issue – the use of subcontractors for transport in the chemical 
industry (CEFIC 2005). 
Figure 1. Eight phases of contractor management (OGP 2010). 
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